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A Disconnected Dialogue
GREGORY DADDIS
AMERICAN MILITARY STRATEGY, 1964-1968
4. USS Iwo Jima. U.S. Marines board Sikorsky 
UH-34D Seahorse helicopters, Operation Dagger 
Thrust, Dec. 1965 (USN). 5. Soldiers cover fire with 
M60 machine gun, 1966 (U.S. Army). 6. Civilians 
killed in explosion of Viet Cong mine, 1966 (DOD). 
7. Vietnamese army personnel, May 1962 (DOD, 
NARA). 8. Commanding General William C. 




1. ARVN soldiers with U.S. Special Forces, 
Sept. 1968 (U.S. Army). 2. President Lyndon 
B. Johnson visits U.S. soldiers at Cam Rahn 
Bay, South Vietnam, Oct. 26, 1966; by 
Yoichi Okamoto (LBJ Library). 3. A young 
private during the Marine landing, Aug. 3, 
1965 (NARA, USMC).
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of Congress (LOC); National Archives and Records 
Adm. (NARA); U.S. Army; U.S. Dept. of Defense 
(DOD); U.S. Marine Corps (USMC); U. S. Navy (USN). 
All images, except #18 and #21, are in the public 
domain, obtained via Wikimedia Commons.
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1995, Robert S. McNamara’s In Retrospect: 
The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam 
(Times Books) hit bookstores. A mea culpa 
of sorts—hardly enough, his critics charged—the 
former U.S. Secretary of Defense detailed the many 
blunders and miscalculations leading to America’s 
fateful loss in the Vietnam War. McNamara notably 
conceded he had “erred by not forcing . . . a knock-
down, drag-out debate over the loose assumptions, 
unasked questions, and thin analyses underlying our 
military strategy in Vietnam.”
The admission, supported by a careful reading of 
the historical record, begs larger questions: How do 
we remember American strategy in Vietnam? What 
language do we use to describe a war that proved 
so tragic, not only for the United States but, perhaps 
more importantly, for the millions of Vietnamese who 
lost their lives in a decades-long civil war? In coming 
to grips with a complex war, Americans, then and 
now, have relied on a series of tropes to streamline 
their conversations about a distasteful war. Terms 
like “attrition,” “search-and-destroy,” and “body count” 
have become convenient shorthand, replacing deeper 
explorations of a multifaceted conflict.
In fact, this bankruptcy in language proved 
momentous. As McNamara intimated, the failure 
of civilian policymakers and senior military leaders 
to force an honest dialogue over deeper strategic 
questions ensured that policy objectives for the war 
in Vietnam far outmatched the capabilities of the 
U.S. mission there. The disconnects between policy 
crafted in Washington and military strategy designed 
in Saigon go far in explaining the American outcome. 
During the crucial years between 1964 and 1968, 
U.S. leaders failed to achieve any real consensus over 
what was possible in Vietnam, who was winning, 
and whether or not the war’s political objectives were 
worth the sacrifices necessary to achieve them.
On Virtue and Victory
American political objectives in Southeast Asia 
had deep roots. By mid-1964, President Lyndon 
B. Johnson had assumed a strategic legacy from 
earlier administrations that seemingly left little room 
for maneuver. Fears of communism’s global reach 
remained strong, as did assumptions underwriting 
the “domino theory” which presumed that if a U.S. 
ally fell to communism, other regional powers would 
follow suit. To many Americans, it seemed far less 
important that the Vietnamese were grappling with 
issues related to national identity in the post-colonial 
era than the possibility the whole of Vietnam might 
fall under the evil influence of communism. 
 Without question, LBJ chose to commit the 
United States to backing an independent, stable, 
non-communist South Vietnam; in mid-1964, the 
Saigon government (GVN) seemed edging toward 
outright collapse. Reports from the U.S. Military Assis-
tance Command, Vietnam (MACV) and the American 
embassy relayed growing concerns of GVN instability, 
infiltration into South Vietnam by the communist 
North Vietnamese Army, and militarization of the 
insurgent National Liberation Front. If LBJ did not 
act, he feared, South Vietnam surely would fall.
Such a decision partially rested on contemporary 
notions about the utility of U.S. military force abroad. 
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9. PFC Michael J. Mendoza fires M-16 into suspected Viet Cong occupied 
area during Operation Cook, Sept. 8, 1967, by Robert C. Lafoon (U.S. Army). 
10. U.S. Navy Catapult Officer signals launch to a Douglas A-4C Skyhawk aboard 
USS Coral Sea, South China Sea, March 24, 1965, by James F. Falk (USN).
9 10
11. Young men from South Vietnam’s 
44 provinces train for 13 weeks at the 
National Training Center, 1970. Their job: 
Help villagers help themselves (NARA). 
12. Flame thrower during Operation New 
Castle, March 26, 1967 (DOD, NARA). 
13. Soldiers carry a wounded comrade 
through a swampy area, 1969 (DOD, 
NARA). 14. General William Westmoreland 
and President Lyndon B. Johnson at 
the White House, April 6, 1968, by 
Yoichi Okamoto (LBJ Library, NARA). 
15. Vietnamese Army troops in combat 
operations against Viet Cong guerrillas in 
marshy delta country, 1961 (DOD).
16. Second Lieutenant Kathleen 
M. Sullivan treats a Vietnamese 
child during Operation MED 
CAP. Teams of U.S. Air Force 
doctors, nurses, and aides 
travel to villages to treat the 
sick, 1967 (DOD, NARA). 
17. Marine Company 1 soldier 
on patrol south of Da Nang, 
Oct. 30, 1969 (DOD, NARA). 
18. Marines blow up bunkers and 
tunnels used by the Viet Cong 
during Operation Georgia, May 
5, 1966 (DOD, NARA). 19. John 
Kerry, spokesman for Vietnam 
Veterans Against the War, April 
21, 1971, by Warren K. Leffler, 







Policymakers simply assumed American power would prevail.
EXCEPTIONALISM
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Most Americans, still viewing victory in 
World War II as proof of their nation’s 
power and virtue, saw few, if any, limits 
to what they could accomplish. In short, 
almost any foreign policy problem could 
be solved with the right mix of military 
power, economic support, and develop-
mental aid.
When Operation Rolling Thunder, 
an extended bombing campaign against 
North Vietnam in early 1965, failed to 
deliver any appreciable gains, consensus 
grew inside the White House for further 
escalation. Johnson inched closer and 
closer to deploying U.S. ground combat 
troops in Vietnam. There was little discus-
sion, however, about how best to use these 
troops and how likely their deployment 
would achieve U.S. political objectives in 
Southeast Asia. As McNamara admitted, 
senior policymakers simply assumed 
American power would prevail and thus 
maintain a noncommunist nation in 
South Vietnam. 
Power, Purpose, and Pacification
The conception and implementation 
of U.S. military strategy in Vietnam 
fell to MACV’s commander, General 
William C. Westmoreland. A veteran of 
World War II and the Korean War, and 
a former West Point superintendent, 
Westmoreland was widely respected. 
His presence in crafting strategy loomed 
large. Throughout that crucial first year 
of American combat troop deployment to 
Vietnam, few policymakers sought to link 
the president’s larger political objectives 
to the military strategy being developed 
in Westmoreland’s headquarters. Both 
the White House and MACV realized 
difficulties were ahead, yet only a handful 
of senior leaders questioned the feasi-
bility of attaining lofty political aims with 
a strategy ultimately resting on a weak 
Saigon government. Critical strategic 
discussions—those matching military 
means to political ends—were missing in 
the year of American escalation.
Standard critiques of Westmoreland’s 
strategy contend the U.S. Army con- 
centrated solely on “attrition,” the 
wearing down of enemy combat 
units. In actuality, MACV undertook a 
comprehensive approach. Still, strategic 
planning rested upon universally-held 
assumptions about U.S. military power 
and what it could deliver. Even with 
presidential restrictions limiting the 
war’s geographical boundaries and 
prohibiting the call-up of U.S. strategic 
reserve forces, uniformed leaders 
remained optimistic that, over time, they 
could fulfill Johnson’s political aims.
Westmoreland consequently devel-
oped a wide-ranging concept of oper-
ations in mid-1965. He not only had to 
keep North Vietnamese army units, or 
“bully boys” as he termed them, away 
from the population, but also defeat the 
local insurgency, the “termites,” operating 
throughout South Vietnam’s hamlets 
and villages. This dual-threat meant 
Westmoreland could not ignore the 
military aspects of a political conflict. 
After first “halting the losing trend” by 
defending South Vietnam’s population 
centers, the U.S. and South Vietnamese 
allies would resume the offensive by 
attacking both enemy main force units 
and the insurgency’s infrastructure. 
During this critical phase, 
Westmoreland intended security in- 
creases to facilitate pacification, a 
process MACV defined as “establishing 
or re-establishing local government 
responsive to and involving participation 
of the people,” thus linking the rural 
population to the GVN. Battle, in short, 
had political purpose. In the final phase, 
MACV sought the insurgency’s complete 
destruction while assisting Saigon in 
maintaining internal order and protecting 
the nation’s borders. Throughout all 
phases, Westmoreland anticipated 
improvements within the South 
Vietnamese army (ARVN), so, ultimately, 
the Americans could hand over the war.
Casualties of War and Words
Many of those Americans, however, 
found their mission in Vietnam as frus-
trating as it was deadly. Long, grueling 
patrols across difficult terrain—through 
dark jungles and muddy rice paddies—
frequently came up emptyhanded against 
an elusive enemy. Insurgent attacks, in 
the form of deadly ambushes, sapped 
U.S. manpower in combat units, while 
young American soldiers and marines 
contended with mines, booby traps, 
and the seemingly ever-present jungle 
boot rot. For combat soldiers, it proved 
an exhausting war. Worse (it seemed to 
them), Americans were doing all the hard 
fighting while their South Vietnamese 
allies took a safer back seat. Such atti-
tudes were hardly fair (or accurate), as 
demonstrated by the losses ARVN troops 
and local territorial militia suffered 
through years of continual conflict. Still, 
the necessity to defeat the enemy in the 
field while simultaneously protecting the 
population from attack presented U.S. 
troops with challenges as taxing as they 
were complicated.
But such fighting held stark conse-
quences for the South Vietnamese popu-
lation as well. Military operations forced 
families from their ancestral homes, 
leaving a refugee population uprooted 
and adrift for months at a time. The 
use of herbicides, intended to deprive 
the enemy of natural cover, destroyed 
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crops and exposed rural farmers and 
their families to dangerous chemicals. 
And young American soldiers, unable 
to tell friend from foe in a war without 
front lines, often took a heavy-handed 
approach when dealing with the popu-
lation. While atrocities like My Lai were 
far from common, the South Vietnamese 
lived on a landscape permeated by death, 
destruction, and fear. 
Battle also became a main compo-
nent of the war’s popular narrative. 
Terms like “body counts,” “attrition,” and 
“search-and-destroy” quickly evolved 
into mainstays of public discussions on 
the war, overshadowing the allies’ more 
nuanced strategic approach. To critics, 
Westmoreland ignored the war’s political 
components in a misguided search for 
heroic battlefield victories.
Yet, a deeper examination finds a far 
more holistic strategy. Westmoreland’s 
command focused on a wide array of 
tasks—expanding the population living in 
“secure” areas, ensuring the defense of 
food-producing regions, and increasing 
the usage of critical roads and railroads. 
The 1966 Honolulu Conference decree 
charged Westmoreland to “attrite” Viet 
Cong and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) 
“forces at a rate at least as high as their 
capacity to put men in the field.” But 
aiming for such a “crossover point” did 
not preclude MACV from accomplishing 
other important nonmilitary objectives.
Certainly, a multidimensional strat- 
egy risked uncertainty at the soldier 
level. In the field, many troops could 
not make sense of a war requiring them 
to simultaneously create (nation-build) 
and destroy (defeat the enemy). Here, 
Westmoreland struggled to articulate 
his strategy to numerous audiences—
the White House, the Saigon leader-
ship, the press, his own troops, and the 
American public back home. By the end 
of 1966, while the enemy tide had been 
stemmed, forward momentum seemed 
lacking. Some observers began to 
wonder if the war had sunk into an 
uneasy stalemate. 
Limits of Military Force
The increasing focus on pacification— 
what LBJ called “the other war”—
illustrated the ways in which the White 
House aimed to export the Great 
Society domestic agenda abroad. While 
the president made clear his desire to 
accentuate the war’s non-military aspects, 
little debate accompanied decisions 
on how (or even if) U.S. military forces 
could spur “revolutionary development” 
inside South Vietnam, balancing 
security with economic, political, and 
social development. American-centric 
definitions of terms like “revolutionary 
development,” “civic action,” and 
“pacification” habitually seemed out-of-
step with rural realities in Vietnam. 
MACV’s definition of civic action, for 
example, intended to employ “indigenous 
military forces on projects useful to the 
local population at all levels.” But such 
initiatives failed to inspire nationwide 
loyalty to the Saigon government, a 
necessity in a political civil war. In truth, 
the allies frequently talked past each 
other when relating military strategy 
to concepts of social revolution among 
South Vietnam’s population.
Still, MACV put its shoulder into paci-
fication and, in 1967, created the Office of 
Civil Operations and Rural Development 
Support (CORDS), centralizing U.S. 
efforts within military headquarters. As 
in so many aspects of strategy, though, 
too few of the war’s managers asked 
whether the American definition of 
pacification was even feasible. How, 
for instance, could foreigners establish 
lasting bonds between local peoples 
and their own government?
The pacification effort proved more 
than just rhetoric. In the field, units like 
the 4th Infantry Division instituted a “Good 
Neighbor” program as groundwork 
for social and economic development. 
Others, like the 25th Infantry Division 
in Hau Nghia province, undertook civic 
action projects: constructing schools, 
hospitals, and churches; assisting in 
agricultural planting, harvesting, and pro- 
cessing; and furnishing food, clothing, and 
medical supplies to the local population. 
COMPLICATED MISSION
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19. General William Westmoreland, flanked by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, left, and President Lyndon Johnson, 
right, at a press conference outside the White House, April 7, 1968, by Frank Wolfe (LBJ Library, NARA).
20. A U.S. Navy river patrol boat crewman during a day-long 
patrol on the Go Cong River, Jan. 1967 (DOD, NARA).
Many troops could not make sense of a war requiring 
them to simultaneously create (nation-build) and 
destroy (defeat the enemy).
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Once again, however, a broken 
dialogue between U.S. forces and the 
South Vietnamese seemed to undermine 
any sense of lasting progress. Local 
communities too often blamed Amer-
icans, rather than insurgents, for the 
devastation brought upon their hamlets 
and villages. ARVN officers and soldiers 
chafed under the tutelage of overbearing 
U.S. advisors who too often demeaned 
them. And, across South Vietnam, local 
province and district chiefs too often felt 
helpless inside a deadly war being waged 
across their landscapes.
Pacification surely gave testament 
to a comprehensive allied strategy, but 
that same strategy foundered, in part, 
because of largely unexamined assump-
tions about military force achieving 
social and political aims in a civil war 
over national identity. 
The War for Public Opinion
By early 1967, many Americans 
found it difficult to be optimistic about 
Vietnam. Westmoreland’s headquarters 
and the CIA engaged in a bitter battle 
over assessing progress. Military opera-
tions made only temporary gains in the 
countryside and Westmoreland struggled 
to articulate his strategy in an under-
standable way. All the while, the lack of 
demonstrable progress led to increasing 
dissent at home.
Worse, the war seemed to be unrav-
eling the very fabric of South Vietnamese 
society. The social dislocation caused by 
large-scale combat operations—families 
being forced from devastated villages 
caught in the crossfire of war—under-
mined pacification plans and larger U.S. 
policy objectives. The rural population 
increasingly saw the ARVN as an occu-
pying force, while the army itself was 
racked by low pay, morale problems, and 
a lack of political training. Nor did the 
Saigon government appear to be making 
inroads into improving its legitimacy with 
the people.
On the American home front, a 
growing antiwar movement voiced 
concerns over the devastation being 
wrought by U.S. policies abroad. More 
and more Americans began questioning 
whether so much destruction was justi-
fied to achieve only a military stalemate. 
White House officials believed they were 
now fighting two wars—one in Vietnam, 
the other at home.
Such domestic tensions led Presi-
dent Johnson to initiate a wide-ranging 
“salesmanship” campaign in 1967 to 
demonstrate progress in Vietnam. 
Three times that year, Westmoreland 
came home to report on the war. But the 
stalemate seemed only to harden. Conse-
quently, an increasing number of politi-
cally-conscious draftees began entering 
the army’s ranks, willing to question their 
government’s official narrative of the war. 
So contentious had the war become, that 
by the late 1960s and early 1970s, the 
U.S. Army in Vietnam appeared to be at 
war with itself.
Strategists despised the word “stale-
mate.” This was as true in Hanoi as it 
was in Washington. By late 1967, North 
Vietnamese leaders formulated a grand 
offensive into South Vietnam aimed at 
achieving a “decisive” military victory. 
Westmoreland’s command sensed some-
thing was afoot, but doubted the enemy’s 
capacity to launch a major operation 
across the breadth of South Vietnam. 
It would soon become clear MACV had 
greatly underestimated their adversaries.
During the 1968 Tet holiday, commu-
nist forces launched a countrywide 
offensive throughout South Vietnam 
in late January and into February. For 
months, senior U.S. officials had publicly 
declared the war was being won. The 
Tet offensive now undermined all their 
claims. Few areas in South Vietnam 
seemed safe. And while the allies success-
fully fought back enemy forces, the 
damage had been done. A disconnected 
dialogue had turned into a yawning cred-
ibility gap. To many Americans at home, 
only two prospects seemed likely—either 
U.S. military leaders had been inept in 
managing the war or, perhaps worse, 
their government had been lying to them. 
Either way, the war in Vietnam no longer 
seemed worth supporting. 
21
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21. Marines patrol along the Quang Tri River, June 1967 (Russell Jewett [CC] Wikimedia Commons).
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The Vietnam Veterans Memorial, with its sepa-
rate yet increasingly integrated elements, now seems 
less to ignite or intensify these speculations than to 
subsume them—at least for the time of one’s contem-
plation of the Memorial itself—into more funda-
mental questions confronted on a personal level: Is 
war worth the human costs? Can wars be classified 
as just or unjust? Why did my friends die and not me? 
Does seeing my reflection affect my relation to those 
named, or to the war itself?
It was probably inevitable, even necessary, that 
any memorial expression of a controversial war 
would itself be controversial. In the words of Maya 
Lin, “To fly we have to have resistance.” Thirty-five 
years on, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial seems to 
have reached a state of unifying equilibrium: between 
the statuary figures of soldiers and nurses and the 
names of their brothers and sisters carved in granite; 
between what the Wall seeks to say to us and what we 
are able to read for ourselves in its black stone pages.
Michael Herr, in Dispatches, speaks of hearing 
this story from a soldier in Vietnam: 
Patrol went up the mountain. One man came 
back. He died before he could tell us what 
happened. 
In the Vietnam Veterans Memorial is a text of that 
story. Though viewing the names cannot tell us what 
happened, visualizing the thousands of promising 
lives lost, the sea of names that reflect our own faces 
as we stand at that Wall, can urge us toward a more 
peaceful future.
GORDON O. TAYLOR is Chapman Professor of English 
emeritus at the University of Tulsa, where he served as 
English Department Chair and Dean of Arts and Sciences. 
He recently served on the Board of Trustees for Oklahoma 
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College and took his Ph.D. at the University of California at 
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in Vietnam.
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Embracing War’s Complexities
In their postwar memoirs, many senior U.S. military officers would 
argue they had won the war militarily but that Washington politicians 
had lost it politically. After Tet, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had requested 
troop reinforcements, only to be denied by a president who would 
decide in March not to run for reelection. After 1969, they claimed, 
Congress and the Nixon White House had succumbed to domestic 
pressures, walking away from South Vietnamese allies in their time of 
greatest need. In this narrative, the military had done their duty only to 
be forsaken by feckless politicians.
Yet another storyline arose in the postwar years: that Westmoreland 
had mismanaged the war by committing to a senseless strategy of 
“attrition.” In this tale, narrow-minded officers sought glory through 
killing the enemy, dismissing the far more important aspects of 
population security and the political conflict so central to determining 
which side ultimately would prevail. No wonder, the narrative went, 
that massacres like My Lai had occurred. In the process, any nuances 
of American strategy were conveniently brushed aside.
Such competing narratives—neither one an accurate account of 
American experiences in Vietnam from 1964 to 1968—offer valuable 
perspective on how we talk about war. Our dialogue matters. The 
American war in Vietnam proved far more complex than reductive 
narratives would have us believe. And if we are to avoid similar fates, 
of simply assuming that American military power is a panacea for 
any overseas social or political problem, then we must embrace those 
complexities. Wars are complicated affairs—and so should be our 
discussions of them. 
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